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IV. THE BOURBON ARMY, 1815–1830

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ON 23 March 1815 Louis XVIII disbanded the French army. In June Napoleon lost Waterloo and abdicated, and the Bourbons returned to Paris to complete the destruction of the army. It had proved itself loyal only to Napoleon and over half of the 70,000 men of Davout's command preferred desertion to the white cockade. The country at large was hostile and in the royalist south returning officers were arrested and several were killed.¹ In August the King published an ordinance 'concerning the organization of a new army'. The army was 'to be formed according to the principles which constitute a truly national army to form a military force in harmony with the liberal nature of our charter . . . avoiding the separation of the army from the interests of the country'.² It was not an easy task. Financial circumstances placed limitations on size, the Charter forbade conscription, the allies wanted reprisals and the royalists claimed rewards for their loyal service.

For the Bourbons the first priority was the Royal Guard. Colonels of the Guard's regiments were appointed in September and the familiar intrigue to gain postings began in earnest. When St Chamans³ was named Colonel of the Dragoons, he was besieged by applicants wanting posts in the regiment, and ordered by members of the royal family to accept favoured royalist courtiers. For private soldiers and horses he turned to the cavalry barracks of the Napoleonic army. All recruitment was voluntary and in order to enlist a sufficient number of soldiers for the Guard it was necessary to stop the formation of departmental legions. In theory departments were to have legions of their own and to recruit locally. In practice little was achieved in the free zone and nothing in the occupied area. In the meantime a commission graded all officers according to their behaviour before, during and after the Hundred Days.⁴ This question of loyalty was to remain a major problem for the army throughout the early part of Louis XVIII's reign. Barrès⁵ recounts the great division within his legion and also how he was nearly dismissed when suspected of toasting the King with insufficient enthusiasm. In August his departmental legion (Haute-Loire) had to be accompanied by gendarmes to prevent its deserting *en masse*. The Minister of War was more

¹ D. Resnick, *The White Terror and the Political Reaction after Waterloo* (Massachusetts, 1966).

² *Ordonnance du Roi relative à l'organisation d'une nouvelle armée*, 16 Aug. 1815. All quotations are my own translation.

³ A. St Chamans, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1896), pp. 303–23.

⁴ *La commission chargée d'examiner la conduite des officiers qui ont servi pendant l'usurpation*, 6 Nov. 1815.

⁵ J. Barrès, *Memoirs of a Napoleonic Officer* (London, 1923), pp. 220–4.

concerned with loyalty than with aptitude and adopted a policy of appointing royalist colonels with experienced Napoleonic lieutenant-colonels to assist them. In general senior appointments were divided between émigrés, royalist volunteers and the ex-Napoleonic officers who had remained faithful during the Hundred Days.⁶ The captains, however, were largely old soldiers of the Empire while subalterns were a volatile mixture of young aristocrats and ex-Napoleonic veterans. Half these officers were appointed by the King and half by the inspector-generals.

In military terms the temporary arrangements of 1815 were not a success. Departmental recruitment, designed to reduce the independence and weaken particular traditions of different units, failed mainly because of the ancient dependence on Alsace and Brittany for army recruits, and the complete absence of volunteers in other areas. As in 1814, the rapid promotion of royalists whose only distinction was to have fought against France, and sometimes not even that, alienated many ex-Napoleonic officers. The commissioning of royalist officers who lacked both knowledge and enthusiasm was detrimental to the spirit and discipline of the legions. Almost every regiment found the officers bitterly divided, united only in fear of dismissal. The Guard was almost the only section of the army that constituted an effective military force, although the state of other regiments varied. Castellane's 5th Hussars, recruited in Alsace, were almost up to strength and training seriously in the summer of 1816. In 1817 they were sent to Evreux as one of the strongest cavalry regiments outside the Guard.⁷ By comparison, however, many infantry legions existed only on paper.

In September 1817 Gouvion St Cyr was appointed as Minister of War. Gouvion was an unsuccessful artist who volunteered in 1792 and fought throughout Europe under Napoleon, gaining his baton in the retreat from Moscow. During the First Restoration he had planned a new organization for the army but had been unable to implement it when he was in office immediately after the Second Restoration. Distrusted because he was a liberal, he was nevertheless reappointed Minister due to the growing concern about the inadequacy of the army. This reappointment in September 1817 marks the beginning of the serious attempt by the Bourbons to rebuild the French army – an objective only feasible if ex-Napoleonic elements were used as well as émigrés. Gouvion himself declared in the Chamber 'It is important to know if we have two armies one of which will be anathematized and regarded as unworthy to serve the King of France'. In March 1818 he implemented the law of recruitment.⁸ In essence this law and

⁶ Ex-Napoleonic – used throughout to describe men or officers who fought in the Italian campaigns, and under the Consulate, or Empire.

⁷ B. Castellane, *Son Journal*, 1 (Paris, 1895–7), 310–13, 327–8.

⁸ J. Monteilhet, *Les Institutions militaires de la France* (Paris, 1932), ch. 1. This is essential reading if the legislative aspects of the Bourbon army are to be understood. To avoid repetition I have merely summarized the more important changes, and readers are referred either to Monteilhet or to the documents themselves. In particular: *Loi sur le recrutement de l'armée*, 10 Mar. 1818; *Ordonnance sur la hiérarchie et l'avancement*, 2 Aug. 1818.

succeeding ordinances were the compromise solution which enabled the Bourbons to reconstruct the army, by the reconciliation of the two elements.

Conscription was re-introduced under a different name as the only means of ensuring sufficient recruits with which to rebuild the army. Out of some 290,000 eligible candidates 40,000 were selected annually by lot to serve their country, and these could provide replacements.⁹ The concept of equal chance placated the liberals and substitution protected the children of the property-owning classes. The number actually 'called up' that joined and trained with a regular unit each year was probably less than 30,000. Monteilhet suggests a figure as low as 10,000. The conscripts spent six years in a regular unit (in practice this was reduced to four years) and then six years in the reserve. The reserve was Gouvion's means of placating the mass of ex-Napoleonic officers on half-pay and theoretically fulfilled the need for a large wartime army for national defence. He himself attached much importance to the reserve but this part of his plan was never fully implemented and the institution was abolished in 1824. The size of the regular army was fixed by law at a maximum of 240,000. For the army, however, the problems of appointment and promotion were as important as these much debated measures. Before 1789 promotion had been at the discretion of the King, and his abuse of this power in 1814 and 1815 had caused widespread discontent within the army. Gouvion's law limited this discretionary power in two main ways. Certain rules were to govern all promotion, and in peacetime the King could only appoint one third of the serving officers below the rank of colonel (the remaining two thirds of these officers were promoted according to seniority). There were various other important regulations. All officers had to be at least twenty years old, and had to spend two years as under-officers or go to the Military School at St Cyr.¹⁰ At least one third of the sub-lieutenants were to be promoted from either the ranks or the under-officers. All officers had to serve for four years in any grade before promotion. These regulations governing promotion were not strictly adhered to; they did however provide a check on the power the King exercised over the army and encouraged ex-Napoleonic officers who wanted to serve in that army.

The importance of the work of Gouvion St Cyr cannot be over-estimated. Armand Carrel¹¹ describes the law 'as the Charter of the Army', and Duvergier,¹² summarizing the debates in Parliament, declared that the fundamental issues were the substitution of a national army for a royal army and the return to the colours by the old soldiers of the Empire. Legislative reform was accompanied by Gouvion's active intervention in the organization of the army.

⁹ B. Schnapper, *Le Remplacement militaire en France* (Paris, 1968).

¹⁰ Under-officers (*sous-officiers*) – French army junior rank comparable to the modern English grades of staff sergeant, warrant officer and officer cadet.

¹¹ In May 1828 an article appeared in the *Revue française* 'De la Guerre en Espagne'. It is a fascinating critical examination of the army in 1823 written by the editor, Armand Carrel. Carrel, a notable liberal, was educated at St Cyr.

¹² Duvergier de Hauranne, *L'Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire*, iv, 289.

He restored many former Napoleonic officers to commands befitting their rank and had the worst of the émigrés replaced. Before Gouvion the only real achievement had been the destruction of Napoleon's army – new names, new flags, new uniforms and new personnel had destroyed much of the loyalty to the imperial tradition. Under Gouvion St Cyr destruction gave way to reconstruction for which the law of recruitment with the ordinance on promotion provided an excellent foundation.

The attempt, however, to create an army from such diverse elements raised major problems. In Italy and Spain revolutions were provoked by disloyalty in the army and a similar uprising was a constant threat in France. Throughout 1819 and 1820 there were a series of unsuccessful military conspiracies and a considerable number of *carbonari* cells existed within the army.¹³ To understand the cause of this disloyalty it is necessary to look closely at the formation of the Bourbon army after Gouvion's legislation. From a study of the various memoirs of officers serving in the period certain factors emerge clearly.

Innumerable examples of divisions within the army and within each regiment are found in almost every account. Fantin des Odoards was in charge of forming the 2nd Legion of the Line (*de la Manche*) and he describes the ball following the dedication of the regiment. Noticing the proudly displayed 'regimental honours, including Marengo, Fontenay, Austerlitz and Bouvines, memories of glory of all eras to suit all tastes', he goes on, however, to remark that in the background local royalists stood muttering 'that the beautiful white uniforms hid devoted Bonapartist soldiers'.¹⁴ The divided heritage led to divisions among the officers. St Chamans was faced with major problems in his Guards regiment; the '*gentilshommes*' and the '*vilains*' dined at separate tables and when he ordered this to stop they started to sit on separate sides of the aisle in church.¹⁵ Some regiments had officers who had actually fought each other at particular battles, and throughout the army there was a clear division between those who had fought for Napoleon and those who had not. The situation was not improved by the popularity of duels over all matters concerning honour. Divisions within the officer corps remained a serious problem and even as late as 1828 a young sub-lieutenant joining his regiment described two of his officers in these terms: 'Captain Verberne was successively soldier of Condé's army, Chouan soldier or officer in the Swiss army and then in the English army up to Waterloo. He had fought for 25 years against officers who were now his comrades'; and the battalion commander, 'who always wore an eagle under the fleur-de-lis on his shako'.¹⁶ By then, however, such Bonapartists appear to have been exceptional.

¹³ E. Guillon, *Les Complots militaires sous la Restauration* (Paris, 1895). No attempt is made here to provide a résumé of the details of the various plots. Guillon provides an excellent account both of the events and personalities. The subject is also covered by a recent article: see P. Savigneur, 'Carbonarism and the French Army', *History* (June, 1969).

¹⁴ L. Fantin des Odoards, *Journal* (Paris, 1895), pp. 460–1.

¹⁵ St Chamans, *Mémoires*, pp. 354–5.

¹⁶ G. Bapst, *Canrobert, Souvenirs d'un siècle* (Paris, 1898), pp. 46, 50.

Many deficiencies were aggravated by the inadequacy of the senior officers. Many royalist colonels in particular were unfitted for their vital task. Castellane described a colonel of cavalry posted to his Hussar regiment in 1817, who was quite unable to give the simplest military order,¹⁷ and Pelleport, on his rounds in 1821 as an inspector, discovered a colonel who had dressed up the regimental band in his family livery.¹⁸ Marmont, analysing the cause of the 19 August plot in Paris (1820), was quite specific:

The choice of the most mediocre colonels commanding regiments was in part the cause . . . old émigrés who were military only in name, or young men who without military experience were made heads of regiments – the four regiments of the line forming the garrison in Paris were all commanded by men incapable beyond measure.¹⁹

Even worse were the mass of general officers. The royalist cause had offered little training in commanding armies, and few of the 387 general officers appointed in 1815 had ever held military responsibility before.²⁰ Napoleon's senior officers were considered untrustworthy and the result was a higher command which was neither respected nor obeyed. Thus the regimental officers had none of the firm competent backing much needed in so difficult a situation.

Divisions within units and bad commanding officers accentuated further weaknesses in the army during this early period. In general discipline was lax, disobedience common and the authority of the officers weak. The situation was not improved by the large number of capable half-pay officers who remained unemployed, haunting the garrison cafés and encouraging the dissatisfied to rebel. Also the lack of sufficient employment for the regular army, and the large number of young ex-Napoleonic under-officers vainly waiting for promotion, helped to produce adverse conditions for the creation of efficient units. With the changing political situation Gouvion was replaced as Minister of War in November 1819 and his liberal opinions carried little weight in an army establishment that became more reactionary during the period that followed, contrary to trends within the press and probably in public opinion as a whole.

Between 1818 and 1822 however the Bourbon army was welded together. The conspiracies achieved little because they had no clear objectives and were never sufficiently integrated to be successful. The army itself identified and eliminated many of its disloyal elements and was never unable to deal with conspirators. In 1820 further reorganization involved the abolition of the territorial legions, retained by Gouvion, and the dismissal of some of the more liberal of Gouvion's protégés.²¹ By 1822 Pelleport, as an inspector, noted that 'the army makes pro-

¹⁷ Castellane, *Journal*, I, 334–45.

¹⁸ P. Pelleport, *Souvenirs militaires et intimes* (Paris, 1857), II, 142.

¹⁹ A. Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII (Paris, 1857), 271–2. Guillon, *Complots militaires*, gives details of this plot which involved several regiments of the line stationed in Paris but was frustrated by Marmont's prompt action.

²⁰ General officers (*officiers-général*) denotes all officers above the rank of colonel.

²¹ The details of the conspiracies can be read in Guillon, *Complots militaires*. Monteilhet, *Institutions militaires*, gives the particulars of the legislative changes in 1820.

gress'. But it was the opportunity offered by the Spanish situation that enabled the Bourbons to succeed in their plan to create an effective army. The principles of Gouvion St Cyr had been put into practice, the army had begun to take shape, it had survived through a difficult phase and had begun to reconcile its diverse elements; but 1823 provided the occasion when the army proved that it could be loyal, royalist and effective.

'The King cannot count, for a war of opinion, on any regiment of the army. A tricolour flag presented even by the Spaniards in the middle of France, would be sufficient to start a civil war there and overthrow the Government.' Thus the Prussian ambassador summarized the prospect of Louis XVIII's ability to send an army to Spain, in a letter of 1821.²² This was the real significance of the Spanish campaign.²³ Until 1823 there was no guarantee that the Bourbon army would fight for the Bourbons. An article published later by Carrel in the *Revue française* claimed that the Cortes believed that the French army 'would not agree to draw the sword against them' and that at home 'our minister (Bellune)²⁴ purged the ranks of the army that he was to use and kept it under constant observation with agents.' [His correspondence reveals] '... incredible mistrust and fears more ridiculous than all the hopes of the Cortes'.²⁵ Thus when the army gathered in the Pyrenees, at first as a *cordon sanitaire* and then in 1822 as the army of observation, there was widespread doubt in France as to its loyalty. Pelleport, who provides the best contemporary account of the military aspects of the campaign, confirms that this fear was shared by some even in the army itself waiting in the Pyrenees.

At the same time people talked much about the so called liberal spirit which excited the army of the Pyrenees. It was even maintained that the staff was in the intrigues which failed for lack of energy... I believe that the conspirators of the time tried to seize this occasion to persuade the army to make, as they said, an about turn to the rear but that the importance of this attempt has been exaggerated.²⁶

Nevertheless before the campaign began there were several official accusations, and senior officers had to return to Paris to answer charges of conspiracy. When the Duke of Angoulême arrived as Commander-in-Chief of the army he burnt a mass of reports implicating junior officers and appointed the most gravely suspected regiment as his personal guard.²⁷ The problem of loyalty to the Government was closely linked with that of the divisions within individual units. The campaign provided an exceptional opportunity to overcome some of these

²² Quoted by Lavissee, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, IV, bk. 2 (Paris, 1921), 178.

²³ Geoffrey de Grandmaison, *L'Expédition française d'Espagne en 1823* (Paris, 1928). The best account of both the preparations and the campaign.

²⁴ The Duke of Bellune was Minister of War from December 1821 to October 1823.

²⁵ *Revue française* (May 1828), p. 143 (see above, note 11).

²⁶ Pelleport, *Souvenirs*, II, 153. The details of the conspiracies can be found in Guillon, *Complots militaires*.

²⁷ *Les Archives historiques du Ministère de la Guerre* (A.H.M.G.) D¹71 (Angoulême's correspondence and orders in the period immediately before the campaign).

dangerous differences. St Chamans (now a brigade commander), faced with an officer accused of disloyalty, was able to tell him 'that his best means of justifying himself was by his conduct in the coming campaign'.²⁸

During the campaign the major aim of almost all the French participants was to prove both their own loyalty and that of their regiment. Fantin des Odoards, much maligned earlier in the Restoration as a Bonapartist, was particularly fortunate in leading his regiment in the forefront of the first division. He describes how on sighting the enemy, in contradiction of all good discipline and tactics, he pursued and cornered them and then turned to his own officers, pointed out the enemy bivouacs and said:

Soon loyal men who have been accused will be honoured. Here it is not a question of holding exaggerated political opinions and loudly boasting 'Vive le Roi' in a café. It is a matter of holding oneself as a man of honour, sword in hand. It is the means most acceptable to a man to prove his devotion and loyalty. I like to believe that all of you will do your duty. Your colonel will do his and he hopes to convince you that he is worthy to be your commander.

Thus overriding the commands of his own senior officers, he charged the enemy, and at the cost of eight dead and sixty-two wounded returned a hero.²⁹ It was this opportunity to settle internal differences that made the campaign so important. The army did not necessarily approve of the task assigned to it in Spain and certainly did not share the ultra view of the 'Spanish Crusade', but both officers and men were inspired by a sense of military duty. Carrel maintained that

the order to pass the Pyrenees found all disposed to obedience; some as a duty others as a necessity . . . [and] . . . except among those who belonged to the court or the faction [ultras] . . . it was not a patriotic war that they were waging but a disagreeable political mission that had to be completed.³⁰

Throughout the campaign there was little fighting. In general the march was conducted with considerable skill, apart from the appalling confusion over supplies which was ably but expensively sorted out by Ouvrard. The worst of the general officers were replaced during the course of the campaign and a few of the ex-Napoleonic officers gained promotion. Over nine months, in the course of about a dozen minor skirmishes and one major confrontation with the enemy, some forty officers lost their lives. For the first time, however, since its creation the Bourbon army was up to strength, its effective size in October 1822 was 160,000 and the Duke of Bellune increased this to 241,000 by February 1823.³¹ It was the only period in the nineteenth century when the price of replacements

²⁸ St Chamans, *Mémoires*, p. 422.

²⁹ Fantin des Odoards, *Journal*, pp. 484-7. The action took place on 17 July 1823; in August Fantin was promoted and in November he was given a brigade.

³⁰ *Revue française* (May 1828), pp. 151, 155.

³¹ Grandmaison, *Expédition d'Espagne*, provides the details.

went down while the size of the army increased.³² Only Gouvion's veterans failed to support the Bourbon cause.³³

In October 1823, when the Spanish King 'had been restored to the throne of the Saintly Ferdinand by the wise and just hand of the Almighty' and the first part of the French army returned home, it was received with widespread if undeserved acclaim. The march through Spain and the occupation were not a glorious military campaign and their importance lay not in the public acclaim but in the impact the success had on the army. Contemporaries singled out three specific results for the army. First, the army had fought for the Bourbon cause when many feared that it might do exactly the opposite. Secondly, it had become a united entity, its members still expressing differences, but now having a common tradition. Thirdly, France was restored to its place as a major power in Europe. Pelleport showed a confidence in the Bourbon army entirely lacking in the earlier pages of his journal: 'We proved to Europe that the French army was reorganized, and showed once again our vitality and our marvellous ability for military revival.'³⁴

Thus the Spanish campaign marks the emergence of an effective Bourbon army. Possibly it made the Bourbon monarchy over-estimate its own strength, but for the history of the army it was very important. The most notable feature of the campaign was the good discipline of the soldiers, particularly with regard to their treatment of civilians. During the occupation this restraint was continually tested but remained unshaken. Unfortunately the army gained little in terms of experience of battle conditions. Staff work, however, was tested by the continual movement of the troops and the quality and experience in the higher commands improved considerably. But the importance of 1823 was primarily in terms of identifying the army with the Bourbon monarchy. Marmont, not personally involved in the war, but a reliable and not uncritical observer of the army, wrote in his memoirs:

The Bourbons had a good occasion to test the army. Baptism of blood is necessary to new flags and new colours, until then the troops had offered little guarantee [of their loyalty] . . . this expedition was well led and deserved praise but also the difficulties were negligible. It was an important event because of the spirit that it gave to the troops. From that moment the Bourbons had an army. Had they governed with wisdom nothing would have overthrown them.³⁵

As a result of the successful campaign in Spain the King could now count on the army to obey his orders. His power over the army as an institution was confirmed by the legislation of 1824. Gouvion St Cyr's principles had been modified

³² Schnapper, *Le Remplacement militaire en France*, p. 290.

³³ The veterans were the reserve army referred to above, p. 531. When summoned to join the army in the Pyrenees in March 1823 only about 10 per cent actually came forward. The liberals maintained that the reserve could only be used in time of national emergency to defend France.

³⁴ Pelleport, *Souvenirs*, II, 172.

³⁵ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VII, 293.

in 1820 by the abolition of departmental recruiting, but the final stage of confirming the royalist nature of the army was accomplished in 1824. The maximum size of the army was increased to 400,000 and the size of the enlistment class to 60,000. The length of service was extended to eight years. The veterans were abolished and all pretence of a trained national reserve was abandoned.³⁶ These changes were important in that they confirmed trends already apparent. The army was becoming more isolated and it lost many of its contacts with society. The law of 1824 meant that no legislation was required to adjust the military establishment in time of peace as there could be no need to exceed the potential maximum strength of 400,000. Eight-year service weakened the already doubtful links between military and civil life, it allowed more time for the royalism of the army to become ingrained in the habits of its soldiers. Any chance of a return to civilian life was lessened and an increasing number of soldiers re-enlisted. The ending of the period in the reserve for trained soldiers and the abolition of the veterans meant that the connexion of civilians with regular regimental depots ceased. The regular army was left alone, isolated and, above all, royalist.

The debates in the two chambers show that the liberal politicians attacked this increased royal control of the army ('extending the prerogative') while the Bonapartists concentrated more on defending the reserve of veterans as an institution. General Foy attacked the extended service – 'to keep the same soldiers two years longer will only make them less content with civilian life'. Casimir Périer fiercely attacked the royalist Laurencian who declared that 'the King was the chief and idol of the army and officers were to be chosen from the families which were the most interested in preserving the monarchy'.³⁷ The legislation, however, was passed and the deputies concerned themselves more with matters of prerogative and government than with the growing gulf between the army and the nation. This gulf was the means by which the Bourbon army was maintained and it affected every aspect of military existence. It enabled the army to cut itself off from national politics and concentrate on the problems of military duty – to the King first and to France second.

The King became the focus of loyalty for the army for a variety of reasons. Napoleon's imperial tradition favoured the King's resumption of his position as Commander-in-Chief. He was the source of all senior and many junior appointments. All officers took an oath of loyalty to him, many did this in his presence; in addition regiments were required to take the oath *en masse* when presented with their colours. The Bourbons pursued a persistent policy of courting army loyalty. After the first wave of appointments – '*voltigeurs* of Louis XVI' as Castellane contemptuously called them – the Court continued to maintain close contact with the army. The military elite, the Royal Guard, was formed solely to

³⁶ Monteilhet, *Institutions militaires*, for details of the legislative changes of 1820 and 1824. In theory the mass of eligible candidates who were not selected formed a reserve for use in a national emergency, but the plans to organize this reserve were never implemented.

³⁷ The debates can be read in full in the *Archives parlementaires*.

protect the King, it remained near Paris, kept watch on royal buildings and escorted the King whenever he left the palace. Vigny ends his story of an explosion at Vincennes with a description of how the King (Louis XVIII), having heard the explosion, drove there and distributed gold coins to his brave soldiers.³⁸ St Chamans' description of his duties as a colonel of the Guard shows how closely he was in contact with the Court, accompanying the King, hunting with the princes and escorting the Court ladies. But the influence of the monarch and Court extended beyond the Guard. The four regiments of the line stationed in Paris were changed frequently. This measure was intended to prevent them imitating the Parisian delight in disloyal thoughts. Also it was to ensure that more regiments came into contact with the Court, and that their officers could be presented to the King while attending the major court functions. From early in the creation of the new army Louis XVIII had insisted on royal colours of blue and white being used for uniforms, although the white trousers were at length dispensed with as being unpractical.³⁹ Every newly created regiment received a flag from the King or his representative and many came to Paris for the presentation ceremony. All members of the royal family visiting the provinces were given a large military escort. Castellane took his regiment of Hussars to escort the Duchess of Angoulême and describes in detail how she paid much attention to his regiment, never appearing in public without an escort, frequently receiving the officers and finally presenting them with the money for new wash-rooms.⁴⁰ A mass of officers received Court appointments and the young Duke of Bordeaux (the 'miracle child') had six ADCs when he was commissioned on his sixth birthday. Uniforms were worn continually at Court. The power of appointment exercised by the King and his advisers ensured that attendance at Court remained an important aspect of an officer's career. The Royal family, and the Court, displayed a close interest in military affairs. Castellane, commanding the Guards regiment of Hussars, described how in spite of his close friendship with the Duchess of Angoulême he became most unpopular due to his supposed severity towards his eligible young Guards officers. Even the royal family appears to have been aware of this petty affair.⁴¹

As the King played a more active part in the life of the army, Court and army interests became more closely identified. Through links of tradition, background and political attitudes these ties were greatly strengthened. Charles X pursued this policy with even greater vigour and continued to attempt to identify the army not only with the monarchy but also with religion. His predecessor had consecrated the flags of the new regiments to the service of God at Notre Dame

³⁸ A. de Vigny, *Servitude et grandeur militaires* (Paris, 1835), bk. II, ch. 13. This explosion in the arsenal at Vincennes in August 1819 may have been connected with anti-Bourbon conspirators; Guillon, *Complots militaires*, p. 120.

³⁹ V. Belhomme, *Histoire de l'infanterie en France* (Paris, 1892-1902), vol. v. A collection of all such changes within the army, to be referred to but not read.

⁴⁰ Castellane, *Journal*, I, 415-22.

⁴¹ Castellane, *Journal*, II, 2-6.

before giving them to the various regiments.⁴² At Charles X's coronation the four royal insignia were carried by marshals. Chaplains were appointed to each regiment. As early as the first Restoration Barrès remarked that 'the obligation to attend mass every Sunday greatly annoyed the officers and made them dislike the Bourbons'.⁴³ Mass was certainly compulsory in some regiments but there are examples of Protestant officers and some sources do not mention mass at all. The chaplains appointed, however, exercised considerable authority. As Marmont wrote in his memoirs: 'The Chaplains received too high a rank (captain) which humiliated the officers. They made regular reports to the Grand Chaplain. They sent notes on the conduct of officers and it was often on the strength of these notes that the minister of war made nominations.'⁴⁴ Marmont may have been biased in this, but he was in Paris and well informed. Castellane, by no means irreligious, had considerable trouble with a chaplain when commanding his brigade in Spain. The chaplain's reports reached Paris and the Minister of War before his own.⁴⁵ Such trends increased in the reign of Charles X. He held services when visiting army units. In 1827 Pelleport describes his visit to the training camp at St Omer. The troops formed a massive square and watched their bareheaded King receive the sacraments and lead a repentant foreign prince to the altar to be received into the Catholic Church.⁴⁶ D'Hautpoul, a noted royalist, was sent to the staff officer training school in Paris and, not satisfied with its standards, determined 'to run it on clear monarchist principles based on religious belief'.⁴⁷ Right-wing generals spoke of the 1830 expedition to Algiers as a crusade and of the officers as gallant knights going for the glory of their souls.

Religion was intended to consolidate the army in support of the Crown, contrary to trends within the nation as a whole. It is, of course, impossible to gauge the effect on the beliefs of the officers but the King did not lack means to judge outward appearances. St Chamans, notable as a royalist, described in 1818 one of his junior officers who was under the protection of the Dauphin as

the worst of all officers, [he] played the role of a devoted ultra and collected notes on the religious morality and royalist principles of the officers of my regiment. I have reason to believe that in most regiments of the Guard the Dauphin's Court has introduced officers commanded to send him confidential reports on these different issues.⁴⁸

It is difficult to estimate the results of the royalist concern with religion in the army. Few officers are reported to be particularly devout although there are several accounts of those bent on promotion, who gave all appearances of deep religious belief. It is, however, an interesting example of how the King's personal inclination, and the trends within the Court, were imitated within the army.

⁴² For an example of this ceremony see Castellane, *Journal*, I, 316-18.

⁴³ Barrès, *Memoirs*, p. 206. L'abbé Sève, *Souvenirs d'un aumônier militaire* (Lyons, 1851), provides an excellent example of the extreme royalist attitude to the role of religion in the Bourbon Army.

⁴⁴ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII, 3.

⁴⁵ Castellane, *Journal*, II, 173-5.

⁴⁶ Pelleport, *Souvenirs*, II, 177.

⁴⁷ A. d'Hautpoul, *Souvenirs* (Paris, 1906), III, 400.

⁴⁸ St Chamans, *Mémoires*, p. 349.

Finally, on the subject of royalism in the Bourbon army, it is valuable to note how the young officers, in particular those educated at St Cyr, were brought up to owe their loyalty to the King. La Motte spent the early years of the restoration at St Cyr. He saw and heard the King on several occasions both at St Cyr and in Paris. He went to several major parades in the city with his fellow cadets, after which they dined at the King's expense, drinking wine from the King's cellar, and were joined by senior members of the royal family. On leaving St Cyr in 1821 he was presented with a sword inscribed 'given by the King'. A royal bursary had made his education possible.⁴⁹ Canrobert at St Cyr in 1824 was handed his commission by the Duke of Bordeaux or possibly one of his six ADCs.⁵⁰ He also notes the great interest of the royal family in St Cyr. These junior officers trained at St Cyr were noted throughout the army for their loyalty to the monarch. In 1830 it was d'Hautpoul's staff officers' school (all ex-St Cyriens) and St Cyr which were to show outstanding loyalty to the royalist cause.

The development of close connexions between the monarchy, the Court and the army is thus a major feature in the history of the period. In the army, loyalty to France came to be understood in terms of devotion to the King. The army was no longer a national institution but a privileged minority. This was in direct contradiction to the spirit of 1792 and to Napoleon's ardent nationalism. The change involved the severing of the ties between army and society, and many aspects of military life show how much the division between civilian and soldier widened; it was the price to be paid for creating the Bourbon army in the midst of a politically conscious nation.

Legislation began the process, both of the creation and of the division, but equally important was the nature of regimental life, of the military career, and of the aspirations of the institution as a whole. Regimental life in the early nineteenth century followed, to a certain extent, the same pattern as that of home-based cavalry regiments in England. The subaltern served in one regiment for the length of his military career, moving with his unit from garrison town to garrison town, seldom remaining more than eighteen months in one place. He lived in the café, was usually unmarried, his whole life centred round the thousand men who composed his universe. Du Casse, who served in the army both before and after 1830, wrote a description of the meeting of two cavalry regiments en route for new postings during the July monarchy. It is instructive in that it shows a picture of regimental life, a form of existence that did much to determine the character of the army itself. The regiments meet, clean their kit and ride into town. After stabling their horses the officers go to drink an apéritif before dining early. Dinner is eaten in the café with three separate tables for subalterns, captains and senior officers. After dinner the colonel of the Hussars holds a soirée at which tales of the subalterns' women, imperial battles and regimental histories are exchanged over countless bowls of punch. At five o'clock in

⁴⁹ J. La Motte Rouge (la Motte de), *Souvenirs et campagnes* (Nantes, 1895), ch. III.

⁵⁰ Bapst, *Canrobert Souvenirs*, p. 35.

the morning the party breaks up, an hour before the regiments are due to depart for separate destinations. No civilian apart from the café waiters appears to have played any part in the proceedings, and politics remained unmentioned. Uniform is worn throughout.⁵¹ Du Casse's narrative is typical of the picture that the stories of military life under the Bourbons convey. The army was positively anti-civilian and particularly anti-bourgeois. Castellane provides an excellent example of excessive militarism: 'yesterday evening imagine my astonishment at meeting, in the corridor, the spectacle of Captain Patau in a dresscoat. I, so strict a believer in uniform, was not able to say anything except "You, Sir, my ADC in civilian dress,⁵² consider yourself under arrest".' The unfortunate captain was duly kept under arrest for fifteen days.⁵³ The officers did lodge with civilians, but it would appear that many of these were ex-soldiers. In the provinces contact between the officers and the townspeople seems to have been confined to a few formal occasions. The whole attitude of the establishment seems to have been designed to encourage this separation. Lucien Leuwen was severely reprimanded for reading a journal in public and discouraged from doing so in private.⁵⁴ He studied old campaigns as did every enthusiastic subaltern, but few read anything else. Canrobert wrote of July 1830:

my position scarcely allowed me to go out into society. I lived very modestly, devoting all my spare time to studying history without looking at newspapers, thus I was ignorant of political matters. I was truly much surprised when the news arrived at Lyons of the ordinances and first risings in Paris.⁵⁵

Separated from society, the officers of the Bourbon army seem to have remained convinced of their high status within society. They were servants of the King, above the bourgeoisie, and almost an element of the aristocracy. This was a claim belied by income, way of life and sometimes birth, but nevertheless important in moulding their attitudes. A mixture of poor provincial nobles, ex-Napoleonic veterans and aspiring career soldiers from the propertyless elements of the middle class, the officers found refuge in this non-political existence.⁵⁶ Their mission was seen only in terms of external aggression or a European war.

The problem of creating a loyal royalist army was solved by the Bourbon

⁵¹ A. du Casse, *Scènes de la vie militaire, du soir au matin* (Paris, 1852).

⁵² In civilian dress, trans., 'en bourgeois'.

⁵³ Castellane, *Journal*, II, 41. The problem of when and where uniform was worn during this period has not been solved but Girardet's assertion that the wearing of uniform 'in society' became less common remains unproven. R. Girardet, *La Société militaire dans la France contemporaine* (Paris, 1953) is the best known work on the French Army between Napoleon and the Second World War.

⁵⁴ H. Stendhal, *Lucien Leuwen* (first draft, 1834-5), an important novel describing the existence of a young officer in a provincial garrison town.

⁵⁵ Bapst, *Canrobert Souvenirs*, pp. 121-2. I have not found any military journal written in this period that gives any indication of interest in the arts or politics excepting Castellane's fashionable involvement in Parisian entertainments and various attempts of senior officers to stand as deputies.

⁵⁶ P. Chalmin, *L'Officier français, 1815-1870* (Paris, 1959). The most satisfactory analysis of the French officer corps, especially its social background and position in society.

regime mainly by concentrating on a small, separate, highly professional army. It will be seen that this solution was effective in that the army did fight with vigour for the royalist cause in 1830. The solution involved the sacrifice of all forms of civilian reserve or a national army. It was a royal rather than a national army, in many ways similar to the Prussian army that Napoleon had defeated in 1807, a distinct entity with little in common with the nation as a whole. Lamarque, a republican, showed particular concern for this divorce between the army and the nation, and he viewed with alarm the prospects for the future.⁵⁷ The means employed to ensure that the army was royalist did much to create the very faults that would partly cause the disaster in 1870. A professional army that had no connexion with the nation, and was thus severely limited in size and form, could not fight Prussia with success.

The small professional peacetime army presented several problems to its high command. The most important of these was promotion.⁵⁸ Insufficient opportunity for distinction, lack of evidence on which to base selection and inability to satisfy the ambitions of career-minded subalterns, combined with the corrupting influence of Court intrigue, made the lack of opportunity for promotion the most unsatisfactory aspect of the army organization. Du Casse's captains occupied themselves at dinner by complaining about promotion and passing round the army list – 'that breviary of our regiments, continually read and reread, becoming in the process horribly decrepit'. The most interesting example of promotion is found in la Motte's account of his own elevation from sub-lieutenant after nine years' service.

In June 1830 my regiment had a small change in the ranks of officers, a change awaited many months, which for economic or other reasons was not quickly put into effect. Six months before [an old captain who had served in Egypt had retired] and the vacancy which he had left was filled by a triple promotion [a lieutenant to Captain, La Motte to Lieutenant, and a senior NCO to sub-lieutenant]. This promotion was received by the corps with great pleasure because for six years no captains had been nominated.⁵⁹

The lieutenant promoted to captain had served for more than sixteen years, having fought in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. As la Motte himself adds, this was by no means exceptional. It was unfortunate that the Ministry did not make better use of the few opportunities that did present themselves, instead of pursuing the unpopular policy of promoting Court favourites. In spite, however, of condemning them to a vocation that offered retirement as a captain as the most common reward, the Bourbon army attracted sufficient officer cadets who remained utterly loyal. This blind loyalty remained one of the most significant

⁵⁷ General Lamarque wrote several articles on the French army of which the most important was 'L'Esprit militaire en France 1826'.

⁵⁸ Chalmin, *L'Officier français*, provides more detail on this problem and limited but revealing statistics can be found on p. 101 and also in annexe 7.

⁵⁹ La Motte, *Souvenirs et campagnes*, pp. 337–8.

aspects of the army and its history down to 1870 and it was inseparably bound to a combination of organization, tradition and rules designed to stimulate obedience rather than individual opinions. As a pillar of the monarchy the army was designed to serve the King without question.

A study of the Bourbon army would be incomplete without an attempt at evaluation. The desire to create a distinctly royalist army was costly in terms of effectiveness. As in other European armies, prolonged peace encouraged excessive militarism. Thus well-known analyses of the war of 1870 often devote a section to showing how various faults, apparent at Sedan, were inherent within the post-Napoleonic military organization. The main features commonly outlined are 'passive obedience', excessive attention to regulation and discipline and a complacency opposed to any change. These weaknesses can be found in descriptions of the Bourbon army but their extent and importance are far from certain.

In July 1830 d'Hautpoul, surrounded by large hostile crowds at the staff officers' school which he commanded, wrote of his decision not to retire: 'I decided, in consequence, to follow the action prescribed to soldiers who have not received orders, it consists of staying at one's post and awaiting them.' At length when he found that this policy was impossible to pursue he sought a senior officer – who happened to command a hospital – and demanded orders.⁶⁰ To obey orders – whatever their content – provided that they came from a recognized authority and to avoid all use of initiative or intelligence, was an attitude which has since been labelled as passive obedience. It was an ideal solution to problems of conscience which were to be particularly pressing during the July Monarchy's attempts to use the army to maintain order. Paris in July 1830 provides several examples similar to d'Hautpoul's; and Vigny's *Grandeur et Servitude Militaires* is taken almost as a characterization of the philosophy. But Vigny was a romantic rather than a successful soldier. The Spanish campaign of 1823 provides several examples of skilful use both of initiative and intelligence. Also Barrès' account of the July days in Paris contains little evidence of the soldier's unquestioning belief in orders – not to be confused with his belief in loyalty to his oath.

The concept of obedience was constantly stressed. It was linked with an excessive attention to regulations and discipline, exaltation of Frederick the Great and emphasis on both uniform and drill movements. Castellane was continually concerned with the details of uniform and drill. In Algeria the Arabs, watching the ranks of the French troops in battle, decided that they were chained together.⁶¹ In the same campaign a division spent its first night on enemy soil 'resting' in squares, one man standing, one kneeling and one lying down. Discipline and duty were admirable companions in uniting a divided army and maintaining an undivided appearance during civil disturbances. Carried to an

⁶⁰ D'Hautpoul, *Souvenirs*, III, 428.

⁶¹ P. Azan, *L'Expédition d'Alger* (Paris, 1930).

excess on active service, however, they became worthy only of mockery. But it would be misleading to believe that regulations were always enforced rigidly. Although duels were forbidden they were common throughout the army, even multiple encounters were not unknown and ex-Napoleonic officers were notorious for their enthusiasm for such contests.

Aware of the army's deficiencies the high command was anxious to create a more competent organization. The defeat of Napoleon was studied with great care. Wellington's Peninsular campaign and the Duke of York's reforms were discussed at length. The reforms of the Prussian army that were to have so great an effect on European history were not considered to be very important. As in England, the triumph of a nationalist army and the concept of a highly educated, trained and practised staff were overlooked.⁶² Apart from this oversight, the period following the Spanish war, ending in 1830, marks a time when the army was extremely active in considering and – to a lesser extent – making improvements. Three new, critical, military journals appeared during these years⁶³ and discussed a mass of pamphlets which appeared at the same time. The military organization came in for much criticism. Marmont, Marshal of France and later to be commander of the Paris garrison, toured Europe studying in detail the organization of European armies.⁶⁴ Problems of recruitment, promotion and occupation were discussed at length. There were even plans for further education of officers as a means of providing peacetime employment for subalterns.⁶⁵

The establishment itself made several improvements.⁶⁶ The basic weapon for the entire army – the musket – was redesigned in 1816. A further model was introduced in 1822 and with various modifications remained in service until 1840. It was then adapted as a percussion weapon and survived in active use until 1857. In 1829 the Conseil Supérieur de Guerre (see below, p. 545) recommended the adoption of a new artillery musketoön – a far-sighted suggestion which was justified by the development of a modified percussion system based on this weapon and issued to the entire infantry in 1841. The new rifle of 1859 also owed much to this musketoön. The principal alterations were the modernized firing mechanism and the new back-sight. The Ministry of War tested many new items of equipment and various prototypes were taken to Algeria by the 1830 expedition to be tried in battle conditions. The artillery was greatly

⁶² The problems of comparative military theory in the early nineteenth century have yet to be satisfactorily considered. However, it would appear that Napoleon's defeat was not seen in terms of the 'new' Prussian army by any non-Prussian military analyst.

⁶³ *Journal des sciences militaires* (1825), the *Spectateur militaire* (1826), and the *Journal du génie militaire* (1828).

⁶⁴ Marmont, *Mémoires* (1826), vol. vii.

⁶⁵ *Spectateur militaire*, 1826. General Friron, 'Observation sur l'éducation militaire' with the various replies in correspondence pages. Also Villeneuve Arifat, *Discours à l'ouverture de l'Ecole Régimentaire de Sous-Officiers* (Paris, 1828).

⁶⁶ For more details on weapons and equipment: J. Margerand, *Armement et équipement de l'infanterie française des XVI^e-XX^e siècles* (Paris, 1945), and Major J. Hicks, *French Military Weapons (1717-1938)* (New York, 1964).

improved during and after the Spanish expedition by the introduction of lighter, more manoeuvrable equipment. In 1829 the Conseil Supérieur de Guerre's sub-committee for the artillery recommended the complete reorganization of the field artillery and this was put into effect during the early years of the July Monarchy. It was changed in 1853 by Napoleon III.

These changes were not limited only to matters of equipment. Gouvion St Cyr's policy of annual inspections was rigidly enforced. La Motte's infantry regiment, unconcerned up to 1825 by these inspections, received a severe shock when it was reported to be unsatisfactory in 1827 by the inspecting general. An extremely capable though little loved lieutenant-colonel was seconded to the regiment to implement considerable reforms and La Motte notes the general improvement within the regiment at the 1830 inspection.⁶⁷ These inspections did much to maintain high standards within the regiments and included examination of the officers and detailed inspection of each individual.⁶⁸ Army training also became more practical. Two three-month annual training camps were established in 1826 and at each 7,000 men from different arms spent the period under canvas completing exercises which sometimes involved live ammunition and emphasized practical, not parade-ground, soldiering.⁶⁹ St Chamans and Castellane both made the regiments under their command learn to swim – another indication of this more realistic approach to military training.

The great weakness of the Bourbon army resulted from the growing division between the professional soldier and the civilian population. The absence of an adequate reserve was made worse by the growing isolation of the army. It was a problem that was very seriously considered by military theorists of the time. Morand, Lamarque and Marmont all devoted considerable attention to the problem of creating a reserve that could defend France as soldiers in wartime but remain civilians during peacetime.⁷⁰ In 1828 the Conseil Supérieur de Guerre carefully considered this problem and paid particular attention to the difficulties of recruitment.⁷¹ The Council created a series of subcommittees in order to consider every aspect of the army and its organization. The Council's report in 1829 recommended that the enlisted class should be larger, serving for five years in the regular army and three years in a local reserve. The privileges of the Guard

⁶⁷ La Motte, *Souvenirs et Campagnes*, pp. 320–1.

⁶⁸ For examples of inspections: Castellane, *Journal*; see also Canrobert, *Souvenirs*, pp. 144–5 for description of inspection by Castellane. The instructions issued to inspector-generals (A.H.M.G. X^{em}) show how these inspections should have been carried out. The detailed returns by the inspector-generals to the Ministry of War (A.H.M.G. X^d 367, 368) are evidence that the system of inspections was rigorously enforced, and suggest that it was an effective way of maintaining standards throughout the army.

⁶⁹ La Motte, *Souvenirs et campagnes*, pp. 321–7. Details of the training camps, with a series of monthly progress reports, can be found in A.H.M.G. X^j 2, 3.

⁷⁰ Morand, *L'Armée selon la charte*; also Lamarque, 'Esprit militaire' and Marmont, *Mémoires*.

⁷¹ Pelleport, *Souvenirs*, II, 174–90, provides the best account of this council. Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII, 199, over-emphasizes his own importance in the proceedings. The reports of the council (A.H.M.G. X^s140) provide the details of the recommendations.

were attacked and it was suggested that all officers should receive their commands by 'grace' but that their rank should be held by right and be removable only by judicial proceedings. These proposals were accompanied by various suggestions for individual arms with criticism of the training and education of officers, staff officers' training being singled out as particularly unsatisfactory. In one sense 1829 marks a turning-point in the history of the French army. For the Government was unwilling to extend conscription, face another debate on recruitment or risk losing some of its control over the army. The suggestion of an active reserve was considered unacceptable and the Guard's privileges remained sacrosanct. Thus the successful creation of Gouvion St Cyr failed to adapt to the new circumstances. The deteriorating political situation made the army a valuable political counter but the failure of the reform movement destroyed Gouvion's basic concept of an army prepared for international warfare.

In 1830 the expedition to Algeria in June and the events of July presented two different challenges. The expedition to Algeria had been described in detail by several sources.⁷² In April the army was considerably under strength but nevertheless eager to fight. St Chamans' nephew was considered extremely fortunate when he managed to exchange his appointment in the Guard for a similar place in a regiment of the line, theoretically losing both rank and pay.⁷³ Taking Algeria was militarily a Napoleonic but morally a royalist concept.⁷⁴ Bourmont⁷⁵ conducted the campaign skilfully and under his command the army remained well disciplined, although once Algiers had fallen the troops had little to do and were eager to return home. The most remarkable feature of the campaign was the excellent supply service which had been prepared with great forethought. In military terms the army proved itself brave if foolhardy, although three serious errors marred its progress. Bourmont's defensive position on 25–28 June at Chappelle et Fontaine was badly chosen, bad map-reading by the staff led to a day (29 June) of counter-marching, and units were reluctant to post adequate sentries.⁷⁶ Passive obedience did not feature in the campaign to any large extent, nor did strict discipline once the initial stages of close ('chained') formation were abandoned. Several officers, senior and junior, showed considerable initiative under stress. While the campaign does not take pride of place in the glorious annals of French military history, the Bourbon army did show itself capable of planning, waging and winning a campaign which presented considerable difficulties.

⁷² Ch.-A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie* (Paris, 1964), pp. 521–4, provides an excellent bibliography. The best account of the expedition is Azan's *L'Expédition d'Alger*. There are many less satisfactory alternatives.

⁷³ St Chamans, *Mémoires*, pp. 485–6.

⁷⁴ Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie*, p. 23, for an account of how Napoleon sent engineers to plan the campaign.

⁷⁵ Bourmont was Minister of War in the Polignac administration.

⁷⁶ Azan, *L'Expédition d'Alger*, provides almost all the material necessary for an understanding of the campaign.

Successful in Algeria, the army was to be faced with greater problems at home. The battle in Paris and the reaction in the provinces provide the last examples of the Bourbon army in action. They are important as showing the army attempting to cope with civil disturbance and providing an opportunity to assess the strength of its political loyalty.

The appearance of the ordinances on Monday 26 July at about 11 a.m. could not have been worse timed as far as the army was concerned. Bourmont and 37,000 picked men were in Algeria.⁷⁷ One regiment of the Guard was dealing with incendiaries in Normandy; 14,000 men were on exercise at camps in Lunéville and St Omer. Many officers were in their departments, having voted in the recent election, and all four Guards' divisional commanders were absent. On Tuesday after mass at 11.30 a.m. the King gave Marmont the command of Paris and immediately he began organizing his forces. Barrès' company left the parade-ground after a drill session at 3.30 p.m. on Tuesday and was in position by 6.00 p.m. Throughout the evening there was little fighting. On Wednesday a full-scale street battle was fought and Thursday marks the first defeat of the Bourbon army. On Thursday evening the garrison was disintegrating, a process that was completed over the weekend. More important than the course of events⁷⁸ is the opportunity to assess the loyalty of the troops and their officers.

Barrès, noted for his liberal sympathies, wrote of the Tuesday evening:

the officers were thoughtful, a very small number approved of them [the ordinances], the greater majority concerned them . . . the position of those officers who did not share the opinion of the ultras was truly pitiable, to kill or to be killed for an anti-national cause which they were defending with great regret was horrible, yet duty demanded it.⁷⁹

Vigny described Captain Renaud and his men in the evening of the Tuesday and places the same stress on duty.⁸⁰ There were rumours of desertion among certain line regiments on Tuesday evening but these were probably only small pickets which had been isolated and overcome. Wednesday was a terrible day. From early morning to late evening the troops were engaged in a continual battle. According to plan they were sent through the main streets in four large columns, to hold key points and to retire in the evening once peace had returned. The fighting was fierce, ammunition and food were extremely short, communications were non-existent. Barrès describes his men as 'calm and inspiring in their restrained strength. They watched unmoved the passage of the surging populace.' Marmont began to recognize the hopelessness of his situation: 'the troops replied and executed movements with courage and determination, they

⁷⁷ P. Berthèzene, *Dix-huit 14 juin 1830-décembre 1831* (1834). A good account which emphasizes the fact that the army that sailed to Algiers was a specially picked force, leaving many line regiments sadly depleted at home; pp. 43-5.

⁷⁸ Marmont gives the best general outline of the military aspects of the 'Glorious Days' while St Chamans, Barrès and d'Hautpoul all described their own roles.

⁷⁹ Barrès, *Mémoires*, pp. 247-74. ⁸⁰ Vigny, *Grandeur et servitude militaires*, bk. III, chs. 1-2.

showed in this circumstance admirable courage . . . but the whole populace was taking part in the revolution'.⁸¹ There can be no doubt that both Guard and line regiments fought with courage and remained loyal although greatly outnumbered and beset by difficulties. On Thursday the army appeared unwilling to face another similar day. The regiments of the line, always suspect according to the view of their Guard senior officers, showed this reluctance earlier in the day than Guard units, but, contrary to some accounts, they had fought bravely on Wednesday. On Thursday morning the lieutenant-colonel commanding the 1st regiment of the Guard (Infantry) told St Chamans 'that the men declared firmly that they would not fight any longer against the Parisians'. At the same time Barrès was having great difficulty in holding his company of line infantry together. Nevertheless, even after the confusion in the Tuileries which led to its fall, the troops retreated from Paris in good order, although many were still without food or ammunition. But the day that marked the end of the Bourbon monarchy also marked the beginning of the end of the Bourbon army, although the massive desertions on Thursday evening were caused as much by hunger as by fear. Many individuals, however, remained loyal and several units sent a detachment under a senior officer to return their flags to the King.⁸²

It is more difficult to assess the reaction of the army in the provinces. The sources of information are more diverse and less reliable. The importance of local factors and personalities makes generalization difficult. Above all there is the crucial question of timing. No historian can deny that the Bourbon army eventually disintegrated into almost total chaos and that insubordination and mutiny became common throughout the organization. But the significance of these events is determined almost entirely by the date of their occurrence. During the last two weeks of August France relied as much on the National Guard as on the army for her defence. The critical period, however, as far as an assessment of the army's loyalty is concerned, is the time during which the Bourbon monarchy retained some semblance of authority in France. Charles X abdicated in favour of his grandson on Monday 2 August. On the evening of Tuesday 3 August, confronted with a large hostile crowd, he left Rambouillet for Maintenon. Any suggestion of an effective monarchy ends with this retreat, although the news of the disaster took between two and three days to reach the remote provinces. Thus an assessment of the reaction of the army in the provinces to the revolution is concerned primarily with the period before 6 August.

There is considerable evidence for the events in the provinces during the last days of July and the first week of August.⁸³ The period in question starts with a

⁸¹ Marmont, *Mémoires*, VIII, 237-317.

⁸² St Chamans, *Mémoires*, pp. 485-529.

⁸³ The evidence falls into three main categories: the unpublished military sources, A.H.M.G. D³131-132; the civilian reports, *Archives nationales* F9 399-411; and the published accounts, of which those by Castellane, Canrobert, Fantin des Odoards, Changarnier (in Algeria) and la Motte are particularly important.

carefully drafted circular written on 26 July and sent by the Minister of War to all divisional commanders.⁸⁴ It stresses that the divisions must be prepared to keep order and maintain discipline. There are several replies to the circular, mostly dated 30 August, and these, without exception, stress the loyalty of the troops to the Bourbon regime, and the lack of disturbances among the civilian population.⁸⁵ Thus the evidence for the last days of July suggests that the army in the provinces maintained order and almost without exception awaited further news from Paris. There were a few units, mostly Guards regiments, which started to march on Paris to support the Bourbons; all were turned back before they reached Paris.

The new Ministry was faced with the problem of extracting some form of submission from the army. The result was a circular sent out on 1 August announcing the Paris victory, and ordering all regiments to return to their barracks and adopt the tricolour. There are a large number of replies to this circular, mostly dated 3 or 4 August. Typical is that of the Toulouse commander who reported that no regiment had marched on Paris and that all units under his command had taken the tricolour on receiving the dispatch from the Minister. Two concerns seem to override all others: one was the maintenance of order and the other the avoidance of civil war. There are several examples of regiments which, in order to maintain order, operated in close association with the newly formed National Guard contingents.⁸⁶

The first day on which the new Ministry received a report of trouble within the army in the provinces was 4 August. The report was from Nevers and concerned a rebellion by the under-officers and soldiers; there had been many desertions from the unit and several royalist officers had resigned. This pattern of events, which was to be repeated throughout the army, was a rarity during the first week of August. There were more reports of trouble in various units on 5 and 6 August. The first regiments to suffer were often those with extreme ultra commanding officers. The situation was made worse by the beginning of the Orleanist regime's attempt to purge the officer corps, and this was especially important in the Vendôme where there was a real threat of civil war. An excellent example of the problem facing royalist officers is this: not only had they already had to wear the tricolour but on the 6th they were asked to contribute one day's pay to the heroes of July who had been 'murdered by the Bourbons'. By the end of the first week in August the disintegration of the Bourbon army had begun. This disintegration of the army which gathered momentum during the second week of August is fully described in a series of reports from divisional commanders and the newly appointed inspectors.

⁸⁴ Unfortunately the material referred to in this section (mainly A.H.M.G. D³131-132) is not classified.

⁸⁵ The *Revue historique* (1931) contains a series of articles assessing the reaction of the provinces to the news of the events in Paris.

⁸⁶ L. Girard, *La Garde Nationale 1814-1871* (Paris, 1964), for an account of the role of the National Guard in the July days.

The army in the provinces played a negative role in the revolution of 1830. It did not come to the defence of the Bourbons by initiating a civil war, but it in no way aided the cause of the revolutionaries. The regiments were not disloyal – the news of the July revolution was received ‘more with surprise than with satisfaction by the majority of the army’. Castellane’s description of the 8th regiment of infantry of the line stationed at Clermont is typical of the army in the provinces. When the company commander was ordered by an ultra royalist general to prepare for battle he replied: ‘Before firing on the people I would pass my sword through the body of the soldier who fired first.’ But the regiment could hardly be called disloyal.

The 8th remained in its barracks with the officers. It kept the white cockade and gave most of its external duties to the National Guard, who wore the tricolour. The regiment decided not to begin hostilities with the inhabitants, but before it took the cockade it wanted to receive orders – it did not receive any. If it had attempted to resist it would have been massacred by the population.

Castellane suggests that the attitude of the officers towards the political situation was that ‘to open fire would gain nothing and it is not a question that will be decided at Clermont’.⁸⁷ Particularly important in this example are the oft repeated actions of refusing to act hastily, continuing to wear the white cockade even after the fall of the regime and the desire for orders from above. Passive obedience is the ideal solution to the problem arising from the employment of the army during civil disturbances. The removal of initiative and responsibility from the individual partially solved the difficult problem of political attitudes, and orders from above provided authority for actions. It was hardly a general characteristic of the Bourbon army but it was the means employed to save the situation in 1830. As an attitude passive obedience became increasingly important during the July monarchy and afterwards whenever the army, which remained isolated from society, was called on to maintain order or put down revolt. By 1848 waiting for orders had become the most common solution to the problem of conscience.

In 1830 the Bourbon army was loyal to its creator, but when that loyalty became meaningless it adopted this new philosophy, which is clearly outlined during the disturbances within the army in August 1830. Fantin des Odoards told the regiments which he was inspecting that ‘politics is not our affair, we only know obedience to our superiors and our duty in front of the enemy’.⁸⁸ Charles X had abdicated and their superior was now Louis Philippe. On 1 May 1831, the anniversary of the feast of St Philippe, La Motte describes how the soldier ‘does not enter into politics but drinks to the health of the sovereign because the sovereign is the chief of the army, the chief to whom he swears his oath’.⁸⁹ It

⁸⁷ Castellane, *Journal*, II, 359–60. Castellane was at Clermont on 2 August. The order to take the tricolour was received on the 3rd.

⁸⁸ Fantin des Odoards, *Journal*, p. 513.

⁸⁹ La Motte, *Souvenirs et Campagnes*, May 1831. It was only in the summer of 1831 that the new regime was able to place full confidence in the army which had been ‘de-Bourbonized’ by an extensive purge which accompanied the large number of resignations.

was an attitude that provided an adequate solution to the problems of loyalty in nineteenth-century France, but it was not typical of the Bourbon army, which was truly royalist; the apolitical stance of the army after August 1830 should be seen as a natural development once the Bourbon monarchy had fallen. The army had up to that moment always believed that it existed to make war or defend France; its journals for example do not mention any other function. After 1830 military pamphlets and journals discuss street warfare, riot control and civilian disturbances as part of the art of soldiering. However, it would be a serious error to attribute this function to the Bourbon army before July 1830. Order may have been maintained by the presence of troops, but the troops did not consider this as one of their main functions.

The army stationed in the provinces was loyal in that it did not accept the rebellion until after the abdication. It did help to a certain extent to maintain order, mainly by its presence. It made no attempt to fight for the royalist cause outside Paris because there was very little actual disorder against which to fight. In general, however, the attitude of the army towards civil disturbance was one of non-intervention and non-responsibility rather than militant repression. Both officers and men appear to have considered themselves an independent organization concerned with warfare and not internal politics. At the same time their loyalty was to the King rather than to the nation as a whole, and it was the abdication rather than the moral defeat which made possible the change in allegiance.

A study of this nature would be deficient without some form of conclusion. The Restoration monarchs created an army and they tried to make it royalist. They were largely successful. By modifying the principles of Gouvion's legislation, by cutting the army's links with the provinces, by inculcating royalist principles and attitudes into the distinct social group, they made the Bourbon army. By 1830 it was an efficient loyal force capable of matching any professional army in Europe.

In July the army proved loyal to the monarchy, fighting in the Bourbon cause until defeated as much by lack of food and ammunition as by the overwhelming number of insurgents. In the provinces the army remained loyal even after the population had adopted the tricolour. Yet the institution contained the seeds of its own destruction. What had constituted its strength in the short term proved in the long term to constitute its weakness. The gap between the army and society, the abolition of the reserve, the growing conservatism of the military establishment all helped to create and perpetuate an institution that was incapable of matching peacetime efficiency with wartime expansion. 1870 can only be fully understood in the light of 1818, 1820 and 1824. The future was sacrificed to the overriding concern to create an army that was loyal to the establishment. Lacking reserves, the army found it difficult to prepare for a European war, whilst improvement remained essentially a political problem. In 1829 the Conseil Supérieur de Guerre failed to implement its plans for a reserve because these

involved parliamentary debates, legislation and wider-reaching conscription. The measures were not feasible for a politically unsure regime, and might have weakened the all-important loyalty of the army. Thus the army that fought so well in Algeria and then in Paris was doomed to become increasingly isolated. One of its primary responsibilities became to maintain order and uphold the establishment at the cost of military competence on an international level. The promise of 1818 was lost in the realities of French political life.